Reconstructing Kant's arguments in his theory of judgments of taste

Tomás Rodrigo Gálvez Paredes

Summary

In this essay, I will analyze Kant's concept of nature in the third Critique. I will contrast it with the concept of nature given in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. One of the main aims is to show that the new concept of nature in the Critique of Judgment can be thought of as compatible with the moral law. For Kant, there are two worlds, the world of the senses (the world that can be perceived, the world of nature) and the suprasensible world. For Kant, reason belongs to the latter; a proof of this is, for Kant, the fact that reason has the capacity to originate a law that is not present in nature, this law is the moral law. For Kant, the categorical imperative meets all the requirements to be labeled as a law. For Kant, this law would not exist in the world if reason were not there and if humans did not exist. What makes this law (or general rule) unique is that it does not depend on other rules or laws, it does not depend, for example, on the laws of physics, and because of this it exists, for Kant, on another level. Furthermore, even though it exists on another level, i.e., in the suprasensible world, it can determine our will and our actions in the sensible world: human beings can try to follow the moral law.

This means that one of the big questions in the third Critique is if nature allows or is compatible with actions determined by the moral law or not and if one can expect to be happy in the sensible world when following the moral law (because it is in the physical world where you are supposed to think of yourself as happy). Kant asks himself if we can find in nature a reason to believe this is the case.

I will explain why Kant thinks that nature or the sensible world behaves as if it indeed were compatible with the moral law. I will show how the three Critiques are connected. I will explain how the concept of necessity works (Footnote 1) . 

Introduction

In this essay, I plan to explain how the relation between nature and freedom is meant to be understood in Kant's Critique of Judgment. This explanation will show how the three Critiques can be thought of as a unity. The concept of the highest good will play an important role, the concept of highest good is understood as "happiness – under the objective condition of the concordance of humans with the law of morality, as the worthiness to be happy " (CJ AE 450, also CPraR AE 124). I will use quotations from the three Critiques to support my thesis.

I will show how Kant wants to solve a conflict between the first Critique and the second Critique; this conflict arises because Kant´s account for the possibility of science and of the causa efficiens, given in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena, does not address a problem in the Critique of Practical Reason: the need of a new type of nature that does not only work in a pure physical, or Newtonian, way but also as if it were conceived by ends and, thus, as if it could allow freedom. This new nature "must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom" (CJ AE 176). This new type of nature, which should be compatible with freedom (Footnote 2) and has, so to speak, the form of ends and, thus, the form of freedom, is a requirement of reason, which needs to find a proof of the existence of freedom in order to prove the possibility of the highest good.

The highest good is the object of a will determined by the moral law ("To bring about the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law" CPraR AE 122). As such, it is conditioned by the same condition that renders the moral law possible, this condition is the idea of freedom. This is explained in the Critique of practical Reason (For example, in CPraR AE 4-5: "But freedom, among all the ideas of speculative reason, is also the only one whose possibility we know a priori—though without having insight into it—because it is the condition of the moral law". This idea is explained again in the Footnote in CPraR AE 4-5). A different name Kant uses for freedom is nexus finalis or also causality of ends, this type of causality differs from the causa efficiens (law of cause and effect). The causa efficiens is a deterministic type of causality which is the basis of physics as Newton understood it. The conflict between freedom and the causa efficiens is labeled as the "incalculable gulf" (CJ AE 176) in the system.

Should nature be thought of as compatible with the requirements of practical reason, it should look, in that case, at least as a reasonable nature (CJ AE 176) or as a nature that has been conceived according to ends; such a nature would be an adequate, purposive nature, a nature adequate to ends. For Kant, this is exactly the case and analyzes three types of purposiveness that can be found in nature: a) The "purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use" (CJ AE 182) b) beauty, "which expands not our cognition of natural objects, but our concept of nature, namely as a mere mechanism, into the concept of nature as art" (CJ AE 246), "the judging of which has as its ground a merely formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without an end" (CJ AE 226) and c) organisms or "things as natural ends" (CJ AE 369). The first type is discussed in the introduction. The other two types are treated almost independently in two different parts of the book.

The first step: The explanation of the origin of the "gulf"

I can show that the problem of the "incalculable gulf" (CJ AE 176) can be explained logically.

This is the case because:

a) Kant's definition of the highest good contains the concept of happiness (for example here: "the second element of the highest good, [...] the happiness commensurate to that morality" (CPraR AE 124) and in this quotation: "the highest physical good that is possible in the world and which can be promoted, as far as it is up to us, as a final end, is happiness – under the objective condition of the concordance of humans with the law of morality, as the worthiness to be happy" (CJ AE 450).

And because

b) the concept of happiness contains the concept of nature (for example here: "Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world for whom in the whole of his existence everything proceeds according to his wish and will; it therefore rests on the harmony of nature with his whole purpose" (CPraR AE 124).

This means that nature should be thought of as contained in the highest good. This explanation may sound too easy to be new in secondary literature but this is in fact the case. This means that the highest good requires a new concept of nature (see again CJ AE 176), which should be able to coincide with the moral law, and with happiness at the same time. This new concept of nature should be purposive and contain more than just the causa efficiens. The relation between the moral law and happiness appears here as the worthiness to be happy.

Second Step: The postulates and the proof of the objective reality of the ideas of reason

In this part of the essay, I explain how Kant displays a new concept of nature in the third Critique in a way that nature appears to coincide with morality. Thus, the gulf, that I have mentioned before, is cleared from the system. In order to do this, I will also explain Kant's doctrine of the postulates. This part is also new in the secondary literature. According to Kant, beauty works "as a symbol of morality" (CJ AE 351). This means that a correspondence takes place between the ideas of reason and nature. Because reason appears to find another type of causality in the purposive forms of nature, it judges these forms through an analogy as if they were the representations of the idea of God and of the idea of Freedom.

According to Kant, beauty works "as a symbol of morality" (CJ AE 351). This means that a correspondence takes place between the ideas of reason and nature. Because reason appears to find another type of causality in the purposive forms of nature, it judges these forms through an analogy as if they were the representations of the idea of God and of the idea of Freedom.

A special quality of the ideas is that they can be thought or judged as known but they cannot be known sensu stricto, this means they cannot be known in the sense of the first Critique, they cannot be known either empirically in a scientific way (like in chemistry) or a priori (like in mathematics). But, for example, Kant talks about the symbolic knowledge of God ("all of our cognition of God is merely symbolic" (CJ AE 353)).

According to Recki the word "merely" in this sentence should not be understood derogatorily (Recki 2008: 199). Recki writes: "A devaluation of the symbol, whose power lies exactly there where empirical knowledge is impossible, and where the requirements of reason, nevertheless, push, in some way, towards the recognition of the ideas, is not in the least intended, in the same way that a devaluation of the ideas is not intended in Kant´s concession that Freedom is merely an idea of reason (...) [Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 448 footnote)" (Recki 2008: 199).

As a procedure, this symbolization is analogous to the schematism of the first Critique but not identical with it ("in a way merely analogous" (CJ AE 351)). It is because of this procedure of symbolization that reason thinks it has found an adequate intuition for the idea of freedom and for the idea of god. Thus, the proof of the existence of the ideas takes place through symbolic knowledge according to the pattern or rule of the first Critique, after which "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [...] Only from their unification can cognition arise." (CPuR B 75 76 AE 75)(Footnote 3). Kant explains also in the following text passage of the Critique of Judgment that the proof of the reality of concepts and ideas takes place through their correspondence in adequate intuitions:

"To demonstrate the reality of our concepts, intuitions are always required. If they are empirical concepts, then the latter are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, then the latter are called schemata. But if one demands that the objective reality of the concepts of reason, i.e., of the ideas, be demonstrated, and moreover for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, then one desires something impossible, since no intuition [neither an example, nor a scheme, R.G.] adequate to them can be given at all.

All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto sub adspectum), as making something sensible, is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed" (CJ AE 351-352).

This means that the ideas of reason do not find any correspondence in examples or schemata but they do in symbols. This is important for Kant because the possibility of the highest good is conditioned by the reality of the three ideas. This is the main idea behind the doctrine of the postulates, this is what it is all about within it.

The highest good, as the object of a will determined by the moral law (-> "To bring about the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law" CPraR AE 122) is, according to Kant, conditioned:

a) by the idea of freedom (for example here: "But freedom, among all the ideas of speculative reason, is also the only one whose possibility we know a priori—though without having insight into it—because it is the condition of the moral law, which we do know" (CPraR AE 4)),

b) by the idea of immortality (for example here: "The ideas of God and immortality, on the other hand, are not conditions of the moral law, but conditions only of the necessary object of a will determined by this law, i.e., conditions of the merely practical use of our reason" CPraR AE 4, also here: "Therefore the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul" CPraR AE 122))

and

c) by the idea of god (for example here: "Therefore the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature through understanding and will (and hence is its originator), i.e., God" (CPraR AE 125) and also again in CPraR AE 4).

The reality of these three ideas is being postulated, this means that they are supposed as necessary conditions (postulates), when the reality of the highest good is thought as possible.

The point here is that Kant thinks that if the possibility of the reality of the ideas of reason is proved through symbolic knowledge, at least the possibility of the highest good will be proved, as a consequence.

The Critique of Judgment works as a deduction of the ideas of reason. Under the concept of deduction, Kant does not understand either a regular derivation or a logical conclusion but the concept of justification (Motta 2007: 197) as it is used in legal theory. In legal theory, a deduction proves the justified rightful use of a thing or property. (Motta 2007: 197). In the first Critique, a deduction of the categories of the understanding took place, this means, that the existence (the reality) and the objective validity of the categories and their rightful justified use for the purpose of knowledge were verified and proved. By proving the objective validity of the categories, Kant can justify the a priori in his epistemology. That is why the proof of the objective validity of the categories is a big part of the answer to the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? (CPuR B 19 AE 39)4. The a priori according to Kant is possible because the categories are not acquired through our contact with nature, they exist in our minds before we even start studying nature. The categories of the understanding exist in every judging subject, any subject can rightfully assume this is the case, and this is why the categories have an intersubjective ontological status.

Not a deduction of the categories takes place in the Critique of Judgment but a deduction of the ideas of reason under the "as if" mode of symbolic knowledge, this is an "as if" mode of knowledge because nature appears to be behaving as if it had been created with a purpose by a higher intelligence through freedom. This purposiveness works according to Kant, through an analogy, as a proof of the reality of the ideas of god and freedom. At the end of the Critique of Judgment, the reader should come, according to Kant, to the conclusion that it is legitimate to believe in the possibility of the highest good, this is the case because the belief (of reason) in the ideas of god and freedom also has been legitimized. According to Kant, the legitimacy of the use of symbols for the purpose of knowledge has also been validated under the mode of the "as if".

Summary of the second step: In the Critique of Judgment, from Kant´s perspective, not only the legitimacy of the a priori in judgments of taste is justified but also the possibility of the existence or reality of the ideas. By proving the objective reality of the ideas through symbolic knowledge, the possibility of the highest good is proved.

Third Step: The subjective necessity of reason is the origin of the objective necessity (or duty) within the judgment of taste

In Kant´s work the a priori has two parts: the universality of a claim, and its necessity. When a claim or judgment of taste is made, it states that something is beautiful and by doing this, it states at the same time "that the feeling in the judgment of taste is expected of everyone as if it were a duty" (CJ AE 296), this means that one expects that everyone should agree with one´s claim. In this quotation, the "everyone" part corresponds to the universality of the a priori, but the duty, on the other hand, corresponds to the necessity. In this third step, I will explain the origin of the necessity that is expressed in the judgements of taste through the mode of duty. This "necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense" (CJ AE 239). This means, one should look for the origin of this subjective necessity. This is what I will do next.

In the third Critique, it is not clear that the deduction of claims (or judgments) of taste is connected to the doctrine of the postulates from the second Critique. But one arrives to the conclusion that this is in fact the case, after studying the concept of subjective necessity in the doctrine of the postulates in the Critique of practical Reason and also the Dialectic of Reason in the Critique of pure Reason. According to Kant, reason requires or "demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned" (CPraR AE 107). In the case of the concept of highest good, the conditions, that are required by reason, are the ideas of reason and their existence (->Second step). This search for conditions performed by reason is equivalent to its subjective necessity or need, both should be understood as the same process. In the Critique of pure reason, Kant says that "it rises (as its nature also requires) ever higher, to more remote conditions" (CPuR A VII AE 7). This quotation is an allusion to the transcendental dialectic. In the introduction to the transcendental dialectic, Kant explains, that reason always looks for "the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions" (CPuR B 364 AE 241) and this is "the proper principle of reason in general" (CPuR B 364 AE 242).

One should make the following observation here: For Kant, both concepts, the subjective necessity and "the need of reason", are the same thing (CPraR AE 125). On the other hand, the concepts of "objective necessity of reason", "duty" and "should" are treated also as the same thing, for example in the following quotation: "‘‘should,’’ i.e., the objective necessity" (CJ AE 240). This works as if there were two groups of interchangeable concepts or "synonyms".

The opposition of both groups of "synonyms" appears clearly in the following quotation where also the doctrine of the postulates is involved:

"Now, it must be noted carefully here that this moral necessity [i.e., the necessity of assuming God´s existence, R.G.] is subjective, i.e., a need, and not objective, i.e., itself a duty; for there can be no duty whatever to assume the existence of a thing (because doing so concerns only the theoretical use of reason)" (CPraR AE 125).

In the second step, I showed that reason looks for the conditions of the highest good within the practical or moral field, and these conditions are the ideas and their existence (or reality). The doctrine of the postulates contains this search of reason and explains it. If one looks carefully, one will notice that in the judgments of taste in the Critique of Judgment, according to Kant, the necessity under the mode of duty (i.e., the objective necessity or the "should") originates in the subjective necessity of reason (CJ AE 239) and this subjective necessity or need of reason appears also in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Doctrine of the Postulates of the Critique of Practical Reason. But this subjective necessity does not appear literally as itself in the Critique of Judgment. 6 What can be found instead, is the interest that develops out of it, which is the case because "[a]ll interest presupposes a need or produces one" (CJ AE 210). The passage of the Critique of Judgment where this interest appears is the following:

"But since it also interests reason that the ideas [...] also have objective reality [...]" (CJ AE 300)

This quotation is the clue that implies that the Critique of Judgment is, indeed, connected to the doctrine of the postulates of the Critique of practical Reason.

Summary of the third step: Reason has the need or necessity to prove the existence of the ideas. Reason can accomplish this if it finds intuitions that correspond to them. The interest of reason that appears in the third Critique is based on this need or subjective necessity. This subjective necessity or need is transformed in objective necessity or a claim of duty through the common sense (CJ AE 239). This third step is also new in the secondary literature.

An addittional comment

One could ask if it is legitimate to draw the conclusion that one should link the first Critique, with parts about the doctrine of the postulates and the third Critique (after so much time has passed and after so many pages). But Kant makes such connections quite often. For example, when he talks about empirical concepts in the Critique of pure Reason and in the Critique of Judgement. In the first, he says:

"The [empirical, R.G.] concept of a dog signifies the rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general. [...] This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearences and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty." (CrPuR B181).

In the third, he discusses the subject of empirical concepts again when talking about the "normal idea." He says:

"The normal idea must take its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular species from experience", and says that he will "attempt a psychological explanation to make that procedure somewhat comprehensible (CJ AE 233)", but adds the following remark: " [F]or who can entirely unlock its secret from nature?".

Because it is a "hidden Art", Kant says he will do an "attempt" to explain it. I think it is quite obvious that it is a hint to a past text passage. Kant must have remembered that he has already talked about this before.

In the third Critique, reason as a faculty is more or less the same reason as the reason that appears in the first one and in the second one. Sometimes, there are some differences; for example, in the third Critique, some tasks appear to be the work of the capacity of judgment and not of reason itself. However, the faculty Kant is thinking about, independently from the words he uses, is the same. One has to pay attention to two levels: the word level in a text and the ideas and concepts in that text. It may be the case that Kant sometimes changes his mind, sometimes more (this is why there is an A and a B deduction of the categories), and sometimes only a bit. Sometimes, he does not change his mind but he just uses other words. One could also ask where reason ends and where the understanding really begins. Maybe he could be trying, consciously or unconsciously, to rewrite something to adapt it to a previous book so he could build a unity. However, the faculty required to link propositions through logical operations, to find necessary conditions (postulates), or just to draw conclusions must be very much the same through all three texts. This faculty, which appears as a capacity of reason, connects the three Critiques.

Footnotes

Footnote 1

The distinction between universality and necessity is not that clear in the deduction of the claims of taste. (See for example Guyer 1997:142: "Are the universality and the necessity of a judgment separate requirements, or do they both impose the same condition on our reflection of feelings of pleasure? Kant's exposition in the opening sections of the fourth moment suggests the latter interpretation, for his description of the requirement of necessity is almost indistinguishable from his exposition of the demand for universality"). As far as the concept of necessity in Kant´s work is concerned, one can read about its different types in Motta´s book. There he talks about "the necessity of the syllogisms of pure reason, which is treated in the transcendental dialectic" (Motta 2007: 182), that type of necessity appears also in the second Critique and in the third, and plays an important role in the deduction of judgments of taste as I will show.

Footnote 2

Freedom is in the first Critique a type of causality "through which something happens without its cause being further determined by another previous cause, i.e., an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances that runs according to natural laws" (CPuR B 474 AE 310). According to Kant, it can be proved that human beings are free because they can try to act according to ends constructed or produced by reason when it is following the moral law. The factum of reason consists, for Kant, in being conscious of the moral law and this leads to being conscious of the fact that the moral law presupposes freedom. Freedom is a postulate of reason because it is required as a condition for the moral law. Kant says that "whereas freedom is indeed the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For if the moral law were not previously thought distinctly in our reason, we would never consider ourselves entitled to assume such a thing as freedom [...]. But if there were no freedom, then the moral law could not be encountered in us at all" (CrPraR AE 4 Footnote). I will talk again about this later in the part about the highest good.

Footnote 3

This rule from the first Critique (CPuR AAB75) appears also in the third Critique. It is explained with different words. Recki speaks in this case of Kant´s epistemological criterion (Recki 2008: 198)

Footnote 4

Kant´s best example for a synthetic judgment a priori about nature is: "Everything that happens has its cause" (CPuR B 13 AE 35, also CPuR B 232 AE 166). This type of causal connection of two different phenomena within the same judgment or claim has its origin in a category of the understanding. According to Hume, on the other hand, such a connection is based on custom or habit (Hume Enquiry 36-37). According to Kant, that type of connection is objective and cannot be a habit because a habit is, for Kant, a "subjective necessity arisen from frequent association in experience, which is subsequently falsely held to be objective" (CPuR B 127 AE 105). In the first Critique, the level of certainty in a priori assertions of knowledge is such that they are objectively entitled to universality and necessity, and Kant wants to prove or justify in the deduction that it is right to assume that that is the case in that kind of assertions. It is not just something subjective. The case of the judgments of taste is complicated because they also have the form of the a priori but they rely on a feeling.

Quotations

CPuR-> Critique of Pure Reason

CPraR->Critique of Practical Reason

CJ-> Critique of Judgment

AE->Academy Edition

A-> first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason

B-> second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason

Quotations from the Critique of pure reason contain, first, the page number of the original edition and, then, the page number of the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (->AE). All quotations from the Critique of Judgment and from the Critique of practical reason are made ONLY according to the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences.

These are the translations I have used:

Kant, I. Transl. Guyer, P. & Wood, A.W., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998

Kant, I., Transl. Pluhar, Werner S., Critique of Practical Reason, Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis & Cambridge, 2002

Kant, I. Transl. Guyer, P. & Matthews, E., Critique of the Power of Judgment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000

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